Written by Yannik Kum
Research Intern,
Jindal Centre for the Global South,
O.P. Jindal Global University, India
Undergraduate Political science and History at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main,
Germany
Email: Yannik.kum@gmail.com
Introduction
As an observer of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the United States has a significant strategic interest in the region. With India positioning itself as a counterbalance to China, and thus a potential ally, the U.S. faces a crucial crossroads in determining its approach to South Asia. This paper will be organized around an analysis of three distinct scenarios, both historical and contemporary, to explore U.S. intentions and strategies in South Asia. First, the U.S.-Afghan war will be examined through the lens of regional geopolitics. Second, the U.S. diplomatic efforts to balance Pakistan and India will be assessed in the context of U.S. strategic interests. Finally, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance will be analysed from the perspective of bilateral relations.
I. REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIO
U.S.-Afghan War
In response to the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom, invading Afghanistan to remove the Taliban, the de facto rulers at the time, from power. This regime change aimed to dismantle the Taliban’s control, as they had provided shelter to al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization behind the 9/11 attacks. The war and occupation of the Afghanistan lasted for over 20 years, in which the U.S. government invested $2.3 trillion in the war (HUMAN AND BUDGETARY COSTS, 2021), which resulted in the deaths of 2,324 U.S. military members, 3,917 American contractors, and 1,144 allied troops. The toll on Afghans is staggering; around 70,000 Afghan military and police personal, 46,319 civilians (a number that is likely significantly underestimated), and approximately 53,000 opposition fighters lost their lives. Additionally, nearly 67,000 individuals were killed in Pakistan due to the conflict in Afghanistan (Bateman, 2020, para.1). The operation ended with the last American military personal leaving on the 30th of August 2021.
The success of the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan has been mixed, largely due to several factors. The primary issue was conflicting wartime objectives, which had a cascading negative impact on both strategy and tactics (Salt, 2018, p. 105). The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction report highlights three important lessons from the Afghanistan reconstruction efforts. (1) the need for a coherent strategy, (2) a realistic timeline, (3) sustainability in the infrastructure projects (Sopko, 2021, p. ‘Overview’). The U.S. war efforts and the subsequent reconstruction period are widely regarded as a failure, primarily because the reconstruction initiatives were largely aimed at advancing U.S. security interests (Lutz & Desai, 2014, p. 14).
II. US STRATEGIC INTERESTS
Pakistan-India Balancing Act
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, American policy toward South Asia has been largely overshadowed by regions that are either more economically significant or present greater challenges (Cohen, 2000, para. 1). The U.S. policy position on South Asia has been characterised by the balancing act between Pakistan and India. It is evident that in recent times the U.S. is frequently favouring India, as highlighted by the pentagon’s Indo-pacific strategy (Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 2019) and its historically complex relationship with Pakistan (Ishaque, 2020, p. 26). In light of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) under the Biden administration, South Asia, in terms of U.S. regional priorities, is predominantly incorporated into the broader Indo-Pacific strategy and is expected to continue in this position given the changing geopolitical landscape (Tourangbam & Sharma, 2023, para. 1).
The rise of China as a global superpower is shaping U.S. foreign policy in South Asia, “Competition with the PRC is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific” (The White House, 2022, p. 24), which is why the U.S. is increasingly positioning a strategic partnership with India in the Indo-Pacific (Tourangbam & Sharma, 2023, para. 5). The shift away from the transactional nature of the US-Pakistan alliance, following the conclusion of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, to a strategic partnership with India in the Indo-Pacific to counter China, forms the current cornerstone of the U.S. foreign policy approach in South Asia. Pakistan has never been regarded as a fully reliable partner by the U.S., neither during its military involvement in Afghanistan nor after the withdrawal. The relationship has consistently been marked by mistrust and strategic disagreements. („South & Central Asia“, n.d., para. 7). Given the ongoing strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, India emerges as a logical ally and strategic partner for the United States, as both countries share a vested interest in containing China’s influence in the region. India’s ambitions to become a great power by itself, not relying on the west, can become a source of contention between Washington and New Delhi and will only enhance the already difficult balancing act of U.S. foreign policy between Pakistan and India.
III. BILATERAL RELATIONS
U.S.-Pakistan Alliance
Since the inception of the Pakistani state, the U.S. has seen Pakistan as an strategic asset with potential, that Americans could not risk estranging (McMahon, 1994, p. 37). The alliance between was based on Pakistan’s need to counter India’s power, combined with the U.S.’s commitment to containing Soviet influence, rather than based on shared values (Sunawar & Coutto, 2015, p. 1). In 1954 both countries signed the mutual defence assist agreement (Sunawar & Coutto, 2015, p. 4), and the Pakistani military elites where trained in western academies (Khan, 1985, pp. 89–90). During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), Pakistan was used by the U.S. to train and shelter the Mujahadin fighters, to combat the Soviet occupation (Soherwordi, 2010, p. 54).
With the war on terror, the U.S. and Pakistan began a new chapter of cooperation and conflict. The close alignment with the U.S during the war on terror has divided certain political actors, such as the Islamist and conservatives in Pakistani politics and lead to internal conflict (Hussain, 2005, p. 8). Pakistan worked with the CIA and the U.S. in locating al-Qaida and Taliban fighters (Soherwordi, 2010, p. 51). Simultaneously, rogue elements in the Pakistani secret service (ISI) aided Taliban and al-Qaida fighters in attacking U.S. troops in Afghanistan (Rath, 2011, p. 100), as Pakistan’s sheltering and training of Mujahideen fighters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, from which a splinter group eventually formed the Taliban (Armajani, 2021, p. 353), has established a close connection between the ISI and the Taliban. Furthermore, the ISI has been acting against the will and interests of the civilian Pakistani government (Rath, 2011, pp. 93–94).
The relationship between the two countries has been a constant fluctuation, characterized by short-term security interests and decisions made on an ad-hoc basis (Matamis, 2024, para. 2). Moreover, the relationship between the two countries is primarily transactional, focused solely on security issues, such as the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaida in the 2000s and 2010s (Qazi, 2012, p. 72). The U.S. has shifted its analytical framework regarding Pakistan, moving from a counterterrorism focus to one centred on great power competition (Matamis, 2024, para. 3). Former Pakistani Ambassador Touqir Hussain argues that with evolving interests of the U.S. in the region, lead to a dynamic where “Pakistan either teams up with or stands against the U.S.” (Hussain, 2024, para. 19) and that there is a clear lack of strategic consensus, leading to a discrepancy which in turn results in a “disparity between the policies guiding the relationship and the public’s perceptions of it” (Hussain (a), 2024, para. 17).
Concerning the zones of possible interests, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan led to the collapse of the counter-terrorism component of the alliance, which had been the cornerstone of their partnership since the onset of the U.S. war on terror. The Biden administration imposed new sanctions on Pakistani and Chinese companies to deter Pakistan from what the U.S. alleges is the development of new Pakistani ballistic missiles (Hussain (b), 2024, para. 1). This new development underscores the difficult relationship and partnership the U.S. and Pakistan have, as two years prior the U.S. allowed the sale of $450 million worth of U.S. F-16 fighter jets („U.S. Defends Arms Sales to Pakistan Following Criticism from India“, n.d., para. 1). Both parties must find new avenues to build and foster a new partnership together, especially considering Pakistan’s closer ties to China. Different avenues of partnership could entail infrastructure development or improvements in the medical field.
Bibliography
Armajani, J. (2021). The Taliban. In M. A. Upal & C. M. Cusack (Eds.), Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements (S. 348–378). Brill. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbv8.22
Bateman, K. (2020). In Afghanistan, Was a Loss Better than Peace? United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved 3. October 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/afghanistan-was-loss-better-peace
Cohen, S. P. (2000). A New Beginning In South Asia. Brookings Institute. Retrieved 3. October 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-new-beginning-in-south-asia/
HUMAN AND BUDGETARY COSTS. (2021). Human and Budgetary Costs to Date of the U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2022 | Figures | Costs of War. Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. Retrieved 17. October 2024, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022
Hussain, (b) A. (2024). Will US sanctions make any difference to Pakistan’s missiles programme? Al Jazeera. Retrieved 4. October 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/15/will-us-sanctions-make-any-difference-to-pakistans-missiles-programme
Hussain, T. (2005). U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond. US Institute of Peace. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12536
Hussain, (a) T. (2024). Decoding the ever-evolving relationship of US and Pakistan—Friends today, foes tomorrow? Retrieved 2. October 2024, DAWN.COM. https://www.dawn.com/news/1808226
Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. (2019). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. THE DEPARMENT OF DEFENSE. Retrieved 17. October 2024,
Ishaque, W. (2020). UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA; ANALYZING IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN. Global Political Review, V(III), 24–31. https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2020(V-III).03
Khan, R. A. (1985). Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal. American Studies International, 23(1), 83–102.
Lutz, C., & Desai, S. (2014). US Reconstruction Aid for Afghanistan: The Dollars and Sense. 2014(22), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2522384
Matamis, J. (2024). Breaking the Mold: The Evolution of US-Pakistan Cooperation Beyond Security • Stimson Center. Stimson Center. Retrieved 2. October 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/evolution-of-us-pakistan-cooperation-beyond-security/
McMahon, R. J. (1994). The Cold War on the periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (1. [Dr.]). Columbia Univ. Press.
Qazi, S. H. (2012). US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: Common and Clashing Interests. World Affairs, 175(1), 71–78.
Rath, S. K. (2011). Pakistan’s Double Game: SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING TERRORISM. World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 15(2), 92–105.
Salt, A. (2018). Transformation and the War in Afghanistan. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 12(1), 98–126.
Soherwordi, H. S. (2010). Pakistan-US Policies on the „War on Terror“ and the Taliban: Allies at Loggerheads. Pakistan Horizon, 63(2), 51–67.
Sopko, J. F. (2021). WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION (S. 1–122). Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Retrieved 4. October 2024, https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/what-we-need-to-learn/
South & Central Asia: The Essentials – U.S. Foreign Policy: South & Central Asia. (n.d.). CFR Education from the Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 3. October 2024, https://education.cfr.org/learn/learning-journey/south-central-asia-essentials/us-foreign-policy-south–central-asia#
Sunawar, L., & Coutto, T. (2015). U.S. Pakistan Relations during the Cold War. The Journal of International Relations, Peace Studies, and Development, 1(1), 1–11.
The White House. (2022). NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OCTOBER 2022 (S. 1–48). The United States of America.
Tourangbam, M., & Sharma, V. (2023). Where Does South Asia Fit Now in US Security and Defense Strategies? The Diplomat. Retrieved 3. October 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20240614133601/https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/where-does-south-asia-fit-now-in-us-security-and-defense-strategies/
US defends arms sales to Pakistan following criticism from India. (n.d.). Al Jazeera. Retrieved 4. October 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/27/us-defends-arms-sales-to-pakistan-amid-criticism-from-india
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author (s). They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Jindal Centre for the Global South or its members.
Global South Studies Series 