Written by Meenakshi R Nair
Research Intern, Jindal Centre for the Global South, O.P. Jindal Global University, India
M.A. Diplomacy, Law and Business (2024-2026), Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University
Email- 24jsia-mrnair@jgu.edu.in
Introduction
Unlike a decade ago, climate change is now part of debates and is a known concept to most people. Today, environmental and climate change activists strive to inform society that climate change has severe implications. Several instances, like the loss of biodiversity, disappearance of land, and drastic, unpredictable seasonal phenomena, are unmistakable evidence of the change in climate globally. The Kiribati Islands, found in the South Pacific, are yet another example of the climate crisis. According to the World Bank and NASA, the sea level has risen by 2–4 inches in the last 30 years (Chapman et al., 2021). At the alarming rate at which sea levels are rising, it is a global concern that the island may soon cease to exist.
Climate change is perceived globally as a “tragedy of the commons” (Kjeldahl & Hendricks, 2018). While the climate crisis is a global responsibility, some parts of the world are subject to its worst adversities, like the small islands of the South Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asian regions (due to their geographical location and the structural inequalities in combating the climate crisis) (Kjeldahl & Hendricks, 2018). The brunt of climate change is reflected in the frequency of cyclones, hurricanes, and the dramatic rise in sea levels. A quintessential question following this argument that needs to be considered here is whether the climate change crisis impacts the globe uniformly.
To answer this question, this paper argues that climate change does and does not impact the globe uniformly. For example, Japan naturally lies in what is called an earthquake-induced, tsunami-prone zone, and over the years, the number of earthquakes, even though small, has increased due to the “seismic swarm” that is affected by rain, climate change, rising sea levels, and snow (Poupee & Hiyama, 2018). The frequent flash floods in Florida in the U.S. and the wildfires in California and Los Angeles are also because of the drastic effects of climate change (Franciosi et al., 2020). These examples illustrate that while climate change does impact globally, the severity of its effects and its impact differ, with each country facing it differently. While some have the ability and resources to combat these changes effectively, populations isolated from the mainland, or people in occupations that depend on nature, thereby become more vulnerable to the crisis. Thus, the concept of climate injustice becomes even more important in this scenario.
Japan introduced and set an example for sustainable practices across the world, and several governments across the globe have plans to adopt similar strategies. However, sustainable practices at large can be a costly affair, even if they may be cost-efficient at an individual level (Gutsa, 2025). Countries with larger populations and limited means, such as many Global South countries, often find it challenging to adopt sustainable practices completely (Gutsa, 2025; World Bank, 2024). These are developing economies that are forced to choose a trade-off between sustainable practices and development (Gutsa, 2025). They face a dilemma, and hence, while a few of them forgo sustainable practices for development, some, like India, have tried to balance both sustainable development and the economy.
The Indian Union Budget for 2025–2026 has allotted ₹7,400 crore for renewable energy and ₹4,435 crore for e-transportation (Singh, 2025), together accounting for just 0.067% of the total budget (Ministry of Finance, 2025). Despite being the world’s most populous country, India has allocated only this small share to environment and climate change, raising concern among climate activists and environmentalists (India Population (2025) – Worldometer, 2025). In comparison, Indonesia, the fourth most populous country, has allocated IDR 702.9 trillion for 2025–2026, representing 3.2% of its total budget (State Document and Translation of Republic of Indonesia, 2024). Southeast Asia is especially vulnerable to climate change (Werrell & Femia, 2016), with much of its population dependent on limited natural resources that are becoming scarcer due to environmental shifts. The Mekong River is one such example.
The article draws inferences from the theory of states and its elements to define the problems states face due to climate change, using the Mekong River in an East Asian nation as a case study. It examines how the four elements of the state, territory, people, sovereignty, and government, are affected by climate change, thereby undermining state stability. In doing so, it considers the traditional conception of the state while also challenging it. The paper further seeks to establish the link between climate change and political conflict as a potential aftermath of environmental change.
Climate Change as a Security Threat:
In today’s political world order, climate change is often perceived as a “soft security” issue (Werrell & Femia, 2016). The common saying that water resources could trigger the Third World War stems from an understanding of how scarce water truly is. Water scarcity also serves as an important indicator of climate change, a point first highlighted by Dr. Ismail Serageldin, former Vice President of the World Bank (Serageldin, 2009). Director Betsy Hartmann and author Mike Hulme have questioned the political link with climate in their respective works. This link can be better understood by examining states’ consumption of natural resources. The latest challenge Southeast Asia faces is prolonged heat waves, which in 2024 extended to eastern India and northern and southern China. Historically, the hottest months in Southeast Asia have been April and May. However, since 2021, heat waves have persisted for 3–4 months, creating prolonged dry seasons that have severely affected regional crops.
Mekong River: A Source of Political Instability in Southeast Asian Region
Thailand’s key water and marine source, the Mekong River, is a vital livelihood for the fishing community, alongside the South China Sea. Apart from Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia also share the Mekong River basin (Busby, 2007). The agriculture and livestock industries likewise depend on the river to thrive. In recent years, however, the Mekong has faced drastic depletion. The Thai government believes this scarcity has been aggravated by a Chinese dam built on the river’s upper banks. This depletion has not only disrupted economic activity but also strained China–Thailand relations (Marks, 2011). Vietnam, another major beneficiary of the Mekong, faces severe saltwater intrusion, which curbs agricultural production, especially rice cultivation, a staple that feeds much of Asia and the world (Ao, 2021).
Political scientists like Busby have predicted that Thailand may, in the near future, face increased escalations with its neighbours over challenges stemming from climate change, including refugee settlement, energy policy, and water management (Busby, 2007). The Mekong River is severely affecting regional stability due to the depletion of water resources, which different countries depend on to address different needs. This depletion has created instability within states sharing the Mekong River basin (Ardan & Capri, 2024).
The scarcity of the Mekong River basin has also contributed to forced migration. An estimated 3.3 million people in the Southeast Asian region are classified as climate migrants, those whose livelihoods, once dependent on the lower Mekong basins, have been displaced (Iklim, 2024). This has led to an influx of refugees into Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, a situation these states are unaccustomed to managing. From the perspective of the theory of the state, people are one of the four essential elements maintaining state stability. An unforeseen influx of climate migrants into Southeast Asian states can create internal challenges, not only competition for resources and jobs but also the displacement of migrants from their homes when they cross borders. This situation has implications for both host and home countries. Over time, migrants in host countries may be categorised as illegal due to prolonged stays, and climate migrants may be perceived as threats to national security, sovereignty, and demographic stability. Meanwhile, home countries might use such displacement as leverage to enforce an ideology of victimhood or to assert political and historical claims.
The Haze Crisis in Indonesia and Malaysia:
Like the “rice bowl region of Asia” (Dulles, 1953), Jakarta is sinking due to rising sea levels. The capital of Indonesia is struggling to accommodate climate migrants and is subsequently facing the challenge of urban displacement. According to statistics, 94% of Jakarta’s population can be categorised as climate refugees (Ao, 2021). Already grappling with overpopulation, Jakarta is now attempting to relocate its population to other areas, a highly tedious task for the state. Indonesia, the world’s largest archipelago with a coastline of 81,000 km, is considered one of the most vulnerable states to the impacts of climate change (World Bank Open Data, 2024). At present, the country suffers from extreme El Niño and La Niña conditions, phenomena that affect oceanic temperatures and, in turn, food production and public health by disrupting normal weather patterns. According to global reports, these extreme effects have become a recurring pattern, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region (Ninh & Kelly, 2000). As a result, Southeast Asian nations face increasing droughts, floods, and heavy rains in recent years (Ninh & Kelly, 2000).
In Indonesia, the farming community, which makes up 29% of the national workforce, has been severely affected, leading to a decline in the production of cinnamon, nutmeg, rubber, and rice, and contributing to a steady fall in GDP (Deetes et al., 2024). Fishing, another key livelihood, is also severely hampered by climate fluctuations driven by El Niño and La Niña. Additionally, the tropical rainforest in Borneo which is crucial for regulating the region’s climate and serving as a biodiversity hotspot for endangered species, is rapidly depleting due to forest fires induced by prolonged dry conditions (Ministry of the Environment, Japan, 2024).The forest fires of 2019 and slash-and-burn cultivation practised in Sumatra and Kalimantan have led to the haze crisis affecting Indonesia and its immediate neighbour Malaysia (Indonesia Wildfires, 2023 – Forensic Analysis, 2024). The haze, a transboundary issue has had severe implications on the health of citizens forcing the government to take preventive actions such as shutdown of the schools. However, these remain temporary but hinder the daily activities and economic activity of Malaysia. The Malaysian state is suffering due to the haze crises that isn’t limited to the state boundaries of Indonesia, and several platforms have blamed the Indonesian government. This accusation has frayed diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Malaysia (Teresia, 2023).
Political Instability
Apart from the health crisis, climate change jeopardises the socio-economic conditions of Southeast Asia at large by exacerbating inequality in the region. Migration is widening the gap between the wealthy and the poor (Campbell et al., 2007). Many developing countries lack the intellectual and economic capacity to bridge this divide, resulting in more people falling below the poverty line. Zhuang (2010) indicates that the already prevalent poverty in Southeast Asia is likely to worsen with climate change, which will hinder both sustainable development and poverty reduction. Geographical and economic conditions are key factors in this vulnerability. Southeast Asia has long coastlines, and much of its economy depends on forest resources and related products. Rising sea levels, frequent unprecedented cyclones, typhoons, and earthquake-induced tsunamis threaten not only human life but also the vast markets across the region, posing risks to both national economies and state stability.
Thus, political conflict and potential instability arise from governments’ inability to mitigate the consequences of climate change. The changes it induces in a country’s landscape and resource availability further confirm that climate change is a threat multiplier to state economies (Werrell & Femia, 2016). Issues such as migration, water and resource management, energy diplomacy, urban displacement, health hazards, loss of biodiversity, and inequality induced by climate change create vulnerabilities for states, conditions in which many Southeast Asian nations currently find themselves. These vulnerabilities can lead to international conflict, hinder development, breach security, and cause statelessness, all of which contribute to regional political instability (Zhuang, 2010). Hence, climate change must be recognised as a driving force behind potential future instability in Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
Climate change is addressed by ASEAN, the regional grouping responsible for economic and political issues in Southeast Asia, yet its actions remain largely inefficient. While several organisations worldwide address climate change, ASEAN is the only body that includes all Southeast Asian nations and has taken collective decisions on the issue. However, its efforts and implementation lag far behind the pace of climatic change. Climate change has already contributed to violent conflict in several Southeast Asian countries, driven by elite exploitation, widening wealth gaps, deteriorating livelihoods, and migration pressures that create both unemployment and labour shortages (Nordqvist & Krampe, 2018).
Climate change is a transboundary security threat and a major concern for Southeast Asian nations in particular. It multiplies threats to both political and economic stability. As economist John Maynard Keynes famously said, “In the long run, we are all dead” (Keynes, 1923, p. 80). But if we follow that logic blindly, we may well end up with a dead planet. When the climate decides to go rogue, politicians put on their best impression of ‘everything’s fine!’ Let us act now before we all end up fighting over beachfront property in Antarctica.
References:
Ardan, D., & Capri, W. (2024, February 12). Unveiling the Invisible Reality of Climate Migrant Stories in the Lower Mekong Basin. Retrieved from Megashift Fisipol: https://megashift.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2024/02/12/unveiling-the-invisible-reality-of-climate-migrant-stories-in-the-lower-mekong-basin/
Ao, T. (2021). The Mekong River issues and the peril to regional stability – Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India). https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=6014&lid=4142
Barnett, J., Webber, M., The World Bank, Development Economics, Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Research Support Team, Barnett, J., & Webber, M. (2010). Accommodating migration to promote adaptation to climate change. In The World Bank, The World Bank, The World Bank, The World Bank, & The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper (No. WPS5270). http://econ.worldbank.org
Busby, J. W. (2007, November 26). Climate change and national security. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/report/climate-change-and-national-security
Chapman, A., Davies, W., Downey, C., Dove, M., & World Bank Group. (2021). Climate risk country profile: Kiribati. In V. Morin, A. E. Bucher, R. L. Wilby, M. Sato, J. Johnston, & Y. Lang (Eds.), World Bank Group. https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/country-profiles/15816-WB_Kiribati%20Country%20Profile-WEB.pdf
Deetes, P., Sohsai, P., & Davis, T. L. R. (2024, June 26). Sites of Struggle and Sacrifice: Mapping Destructive Dam Projects along the Mekong River. International Rivers. https://www.internationalrivers.org/news/sites-of-struggle-sacrifice-mapping-destructive-dam-projects-along-the-mekong-river/
Dulles, J. F. (1953). Historical Documents – Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d169
Elliott, L. (2012). Climate Change and Migration in Southeast Asia: Responding to a New Human Security Challenge. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17163
FAO. (2018). Indonesia SMALL FAMILY FARMS COUNTRY FACTSHEET. https://www.fao.org/agrifood-economics/publications/detail/en/c/1132206/
Franciosi, C., Giambelli, M., Bertran, M., Martí, G., Garcia, C., Hörl, J., Serra, M., Hengst-Ehrhart, Y., Maier, C., Hartebrodt, C., Plana, E., Espinosa, C., Pagès, D., Gasulla, N., Canaleta, G., Vendrell, J., Andrecs, P., Hagen, K., Plörer, M., . . . Skulska, Y. (2020). Report on impacts of climate change projections on wildfires, floods, storms, avalanches, rockfalls, landslides and multi-hazard risk management. In RECIPE Project (Reinforcing Civil Protection Capabilities Into Multi-hazard Risk Assessment Under Climate Change) (Report Deliverable 3.1). https://recipe.ctfc.cat/docs/Deliverable%203.1%20CC%20impacts.pdf
Gutsa, A. (2025, April 21). Are sustainable products more expensive? Ecoswap. https://ecoswap.uk/are-sustainable-products-more-expensive/
Iklim, P. (2024, February 12). Unveiling the invisible reality of climate migrant stories in the Lower Mekong Basin. https://megashift.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2024/02/12/unveiling-the-invisible-reality-of-climate-migrant-stories-in-the-lower-mekong-basin/
India population (2025) – Worldometer. (2025, July 24). Worldometer. https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/india-population/
Indonesia wildfires, 2023 – Forensic analysis. (2024, September 17). UNDRR. https://www.undrr.org/resource/indonesia-wildfires-2023-forensic-analysis
Juzhong Zhuang, S. S. (2010). The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
Keynes, J. M. (1923). A tract on monetary reform. Macmillan. Retrieved from https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/65278
Kjeldahl, E. M., & Hendricks, V. F. (2018). The sense of social influence: pluralistic ignorance in climate change. EMBO Reports, 19(11). https://doi.org/10.15252/embr.201847185
Marks, D. (2011). Climate change and Thailand: Impact and Response. Contemporary Southeast Asia (Vols. 33–33, Issue 2, pp. 229–258). ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/41288828
Ministry of the Environment, Japan. (n.d.). Climate change in Southeast Asia. https://www.env.go.jp/content/900448012.pdf
Ministry of Finance. (2025). Notes on Demands for grants, 2025-2026. In Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change. https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/sbe28.pdf
National Geographic Creative Works. (2022, December 16). With Southeast Asia under threat against climate change, everyone can pitch in to help Environment. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/paid-content-with-southeast-asia-under-threat-against-climate-change-everyone-can-pitch-in-to-help
Ninh, N. H., & Kelly, M. (2000). The Impact of El Niño and La Niña on Southeast Asia: the human dimension, policy lessons and implications for global change. Hanoi: Center for Environment Research, Education and Development.
Nordqvist, P., & Krampe, F. (2018). Climate change and violent conflict:: sparse evidence from South Asia. Stockholm international peace research institute.
Poupee, K., & Hiyama, H. (2018, September 7). Japan resilient, but climate change making disasters worse: experts. Physc Org. https://phys.org/news/2018-09-japan-resilient-climate-disasters-worse.html#google_vignette
Reuters. (2023, October 9). What’s causing the chronic haze across Southeast Asia? Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/whats-causing-chronic-haze-across-southeast-asia-2023-10-06/
Schleifer, L. (n.d.). Water can exacerbate inequality—or it can help solve it. World Resources Institute. https://www.wri.org/insights/water-can-exacerbate-inequality-or-it-can-help-solve-it
Serageldin, I. (2009). Water Wars? A talk with Ismail Serageldin (D. A. Andelman, B. Pauker, & J. Simon, Interviewers). World Policy Journal, 26–26, 25–31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40468735
Singh, T. (2025, February 12). Climate change response in India’s Union Budget 2025 | Climate Group. Climate Group. https://www.theclimategroup.org/our-work/news/climate-change-response-indias-union-budget-2025
Taufik, K. (2021, February 11). Commentary: Little smoke this haze season – but fires rage on in Indonesia. CNA. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/indonesia-forest-fire-peat-haze-palm-oil-jokowi-omnibus-bill-681301
Teresia, A. (2023, October 6). Indonesia defends haze-fighting effort after Malaysia urges action. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-says-forest-fires-have-declined-no-transboundary-haze-malaysia-2023-10-06/
Thomas, K., Hardy, R. D., Lazrus, H., Mendez, M., Ben Orlove, Rivera-Collazo, I., Roberts, J. T., Rockman, M., Warner, B. P., & Winthrop, R. (2018). Explaining differential vulnerability to climate change: A social science review. In WIREs Clim Change. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.565
Unveiling the invisible reality of climate migrant stories in the Lower Mekong Basin. (2024, May 12). https://megashift.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2024/02/12/unveiling-the-invisible-reality-of-climate-migrant-stories-in-the-lower-mekong-basin/Ardan, D., & Capri, W. (2024, February 12). Unveiling the Invisible Reality of Climate Migrant Stories in the Lower Mekong Basin. Retrieved from Megashift Fisipol: https://megashift.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2024/02/12/unveiling-the-invisible-reality-of-climate-migrant-stories-in-the-lower-mekong-basin/
Nordqvist, P., & Krampe, F. (2018). CLIMATE CHANGE AND VIOLENT CONFLICT:: SPARSE EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH ASIA. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Werrell, C. E., & Femia, F. (2016). Climate Change, the Erosion of State Sovereignty, and World Order. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 221-235.
Zhuang, J. (2010). The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
World Bank. (2024). World Development Report 2024: The Middle-Income Trap [Report]. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-2078-6
World Bank Open Data. (2024). World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/topic/climate-change
Zhuang, J., Suphachalasai, S., Samson, J. N., & S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. (2010). The economics of climate change in Southeast Asia. In Asia Security Initiative Policy Series (Working Paper No. 9). RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17152
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author (s). They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Jindal Centre for the Global South or its members.
Global South Studies Series 