Strengthening Global South Solidarity: Multilateralism, South-South Cooperation, and Global Governance Reform in an Era of Uncertainty

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Aryan Gupta
Research Intern,
Jindal Centre for the Global South,
O.P. Jindal Global University, India

Global challenges -from the COVID-19 pandemic and climate crises to conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza -have tested the resilience of developing nations (Group of 77 and China, 2023; UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). In response, leaders of the Global South have called for deeper unity and more inclusive multilateralism to navigate these uncertainties (CFR, 2024; D. Jaishankar, as cited in Business Standard, 2025a; UNOSSC, 2024). As India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar noted at a United Nations forum, the “Global South turns to multilateralism for solutions,” and must renew its solidarity and push for “comprehensive reform of the UN and multilateralism as a whole” (Business Standard, 2025b). Similarly, the G‑77 (a coalition of developing countries) has urged coordinated, action-oriented efforts to “strengthen multilateralism,” harness the potential of South-South cooperation, and place development at the centre of global action (Group of 77 and China, 2023; UNOSSC, 2024). This reflects a shared vision: by pooling resources and reforms, Global South countries can better address pandemics, volatile trade, debt, climate change, and other systemic threats that disproportionately affect poorer nations (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024).

Challenges Facing the Global South

The pandemic and geopolitical conflicts have caused severe economic and humanitarian stress across developing countries (CFR, 2024; Mukerji, 2023, as cited in Diplomacy.edu, 2023; UNCTAD, 2024). Vaccine access and healthcare gaps remain acute, while supply chains were disrupted during COVID-19 and by ongoing conflicts (e.g., Ukraine’s grain exports and fertilisers, and war-related energy shocks) (UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). Rising debt burdens compound these risks: public debt reached a record 97 trillion USD in 2023, with developing countries holding nearly 30% of that, and over 50 nations spending more than 10% of their budgets on debt interest (UNCTAD, 2024). These strains threaten progress on poverty, food security, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (CFR, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). Indeed, as the G‑77 outcome document observes, “the gap between developed and developing countries has continued to widen” due to pandemic aftershocks, geopolitical tensions, inflation, and climate impacts (Group of 77 and China, 2023).

Regional disparities are stark. East and South Asia continue relatively robust growth, but many African and Latin American countries face stagnation (UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). Investment flows have weakened: foreign direct investment to developing economies fell another 2% (a second straight annual decline), and financing for SDG-related projects dropped as much as 11%, hitting agriculture and water infrastructure hardest (UNCTAD, 2024). At the same time, climate change is fueling disasters: 2023 was the hottest year on record (1.45°C above pre-industrial levels), intensifying droughts, floods and food crises in vulnerable regions (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024). In sum, Global South nations face multidimensional crises -health, fiscal, environmental and technological -which can only be tackled through collective action and systemic reforms (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; CFR, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024).

Demand for Multilateral Reform and Fair Global Order

Against this backdrop, developing countries are increasingly demanding changes to international institutions (CFR, 2024; Darnal, 2024; Dejusticia, 2025). The United Nations, long the centrepiece of global governance, is widely seen as in need of overhaul (CFR, 2024; Diplomacy.edu, 2023; FOGGS & HumanizaCom, 2023). Analysts note that the UN has “lost credibility with the Global South,” which is now pushing for more inclusive multilateralism (CFR, 2024; Diplomacy.edu, 2023). Key demands include expanding developing countries’ voice in decision-making, crafting an equitable global economic order, and addressing climate change effectively (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; CFR, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024). For example, member states have called for Security Council reform, including adding permanent seats for populous Southern countries, so that the UN reflects contemporary realities (CFR, 2024; Diplomacy.edu, 2023). They also seek proportional reform in global financial institutions: under Brazil’s 2024 G20 presidency, developing nations pressed for a greater role in the IMF and World Bank, aligning with the long-standing Global South agenda of “more equitable representation” in those bodies (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; Dejusticia, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024).

At the UN General Assembly, India’s Jaishankar emphasised these points, urging the Global South to “bring its specific strengths… to the international stage” and “come up with initiatives [in climate action and justice] that serve [their] interests, rather than align with the perspectives of the Global North” (Business Standard, 2025b; The Dialectics, 2025). He also stressed that developing countries must engage in discussions on emerging technologies (like AI) to avoid being left behind (Business Standard, 2025a, 2025b; UNIDO, 2025). Such messages underscore a shift: the Global South is asserting its collective vision for a fairer world order, one that respects its development needs and secures equitable treatment in trade, debt, technology and climate governance (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; Dejusticia, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024).

South‑South Initiatives and Institutional Cooperation

Strengthening solidarity has concrete precedents in new South-South cooperation arrangements (FOGGS & HumanizaCom, 2023; South Centre, 2024; UNOSSC, 2024). In trade and investment, developing economies are building their own networks: between 2007 and 2023, South-South trade almost tripled (from 2.3 trillion USD to 5.6 trillion USD) and now accounts for over half of exports from developing countries (UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). Expanded groupings like BRICS (now including Egypt, Ethiopia, UAE, etc.) have promoted tariff cuts, streamlined customs, and launched BRICS Pay (a joint payment system) to facilitate such trade (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; World Government Summit, 2025). Similarly, regional initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) aim to boost intra-African commerce and resilience (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; Young, 2024). On the development front, organisations such as the UN Office for South‑South Cooperation (UNOSSC) track many projects: in 2023–24, the Global South accelerated knowledge exchange on climate adaptation, digital transformation and health between countries (for example, sharing agricultural innovations or renewable energy techniques) (South Centre, 2024; UNOSSC, 2024).

These efforts are framed in official South-South documents. The recent UN report on South‑South Cooperation notes that governments reaffirmed at the 2024 G‑77 Summit that SSC in trade, investment, climate action, poverty eradication and the digital economy is “a critical tool for sustainable development” (Group of 77 and China, 2023; UNOSSC, 2024). Likewise, the 2023 Havana Declaration (G‑77 Summit) and the UN’s Global Digital Compact emphasise inclusive technology and science cooperation for the Global South (Group of 77 and China, 2023; UNIDO, 2025; UNOSSC, 2024). In practice, this has led to partnerships such as joint vaccine platforms (e.g., Africa’s vaccine manufacturing hub backed by India and others), shared drought-resistant crops, and regional emergency funds (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024; UNOSSC, 2024). Indeed, United Nations agencies have highlighted how South-South trade and triangular cooperation (with OECD partners) “foster solidarity, knowledge exchange and innovative partnerships to address global development challenges” (South Centre, 2024; UNOSSC, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024).

Building Resilient Economies and Supply Chains

A top priority is fortifying economies against shocks through diversification and fair policies (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). Many leaders, including Jaishankar, urge Global South nations to “reduce reliance on single suppliers and markets” by developing resilient, shorter supply chains (Business Standard, 2025a; UNCTAD, 2024). UNCTAD data show that small island and landlocked developing states often pay 30–35% higher transport costs, illustrating how fragmentation and climate impacts (e.g., Panama Canal drought) hurt the South disproportionately (UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). To counter this, countries are exploring regional value chains and flexible sourcing (UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). For instance, after U.S. tariffs hit Indian exports, India sought new markets across Africa and Southeast Asia to lessen dependence on any one market (Business Standard, 2025a; Young, 2024). Similarly, several South American and African countries have formed logistics corridors (railroads or ports) to bypass chokepoints and better trade internally (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024).

Fair economic practices are also crucial. South leaders call for “fair and transparent economic practices that democratize production and enhance economic security,” as well as “more balanced trade and technology collaboration” (Dejusticia, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024). This can mean pressing for WTO reforms to eliminate unfair subsidies and ensure developing‑country goods have market access, or creating South-South investment funds that prioritise shared growth rather than debt (CFR, 2024; Dejusticia, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024). The G‑77 outcome document explicitly warns against “unilateral coercive measures” (sanctions) and unilateral trade restrictions, arguing that retreat from multilateralism must be “stopped” (Group of 77 and China, 2023). In multilateral finance, initiatives like the UN’s recent support for an expanded IMF Special Drawing Rights allocation reflect this push to give developing nations more financing tools without unfair conditionality (CFR, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024).

Sharing Technology and Digital Cooperation

Addressing the digital divide is an emerging frontier of South-South solidarity (UNIDO, 2025; UNOSSC, 2024; World Government Summit, 2025). Developing countries recognise the strategic importance of AI, biotechnology and digital infrastructure (UNIDO, 2025). As Jaishankar pointed out, the Global South must harness its own digital and educational strengths and actively engage with AI discussions to avoid lagging (Business Standard, 2025a; The Dialectics, 2025; UNIDO, 2025). Organisations like UNIDO have initiated side‑events to map AI capabilities in the Global South and promote “South‑South industrial cooperation” (SSTIC) for technology transfer (UNIDO, 2025). These meetings highlight common barriers (infrastructure, financing, talent gaps) and explore open‑source AI models tailored to local needs (UNIDO, 2025; UNOSSC, 2024). For example, India and a consortium of African nations are collaborating to adapt open‑source health AI for regional use, sharing code and data to improve diagnostics across borders (UNIDO, 2025).

Beyond AI, digital public infrastructure is another cooperation area (UNOSSC, 2024; World Government Summit, 2025). Botswana’s leaders, for instance, have expressed interest in India’s Aadhaar/DigiLocker identity and e-governance systems (MEA, 2025b). India has offered to “curate a special program for Botswana” on Digital Public Infrastructure based on its own experience, as part of capacity‑building (MEA, 2025b). In finance, South-South blockchain initiatives are also emerging: the BRICS countries are developing a gold-backed digital currency and exploring a joint stablecoin, which could eventually link to other Southern trading blocs (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; Dejusticia, 2025). Overall, pooling digital solutions -from fintech to telemedicine platforms -can help countries leapfrog development challenges (UNIDO, 2025; UNOSSC, 2024; World Government Summit, 2025).

Climate Justice and Sustainable Development

Climate change looms as an existential issue for many Southern nations, which have contributed least to global emissions yet suffer the worst impacts (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). Developing states argue forcefully for climate justice: recognising their right to sustainable growth and requiring that rich countries fulfil their commitments on mitigation and adaptation finance (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; Group of 77 and China, 2023). The G‑77 reaffirmed the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) from the 1992 Rio Conference, insisting that “identical obligations are not forced on unequal participants” (Group of 77 and China, 2023). In practice, this means pushing for more grants and low-interest loans for green technology in the South, and expanding funds for loss and damage (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024). For instance, the Africa Climate Summit (September 2023) successfully mobilised 26 billion USD in financing commitments, and the UN’s new loss‑and‑damage fund (2023) aims to channel resources where most needed (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024).

Multilateral institutions are slowly adjusting to these demands (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; CFR, 2024). Under Brazil’s G20 presidency, leaders called for climate finance reforms that better reflect Southern needs (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025). The World Meteorological Organisation reported that 2023’s extreme heat particularly afflicted Small Island Developing States and Africa, underscoring this urgency (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025). Emphasising equity, South-South alliances like the new International Big Cat Alliance (conserving tigers, lions, cheetahs, etc.) and the Global Biofuels Alliance -both India-led initiatives -have already attracted African members (e.g., Angola and Botswana joined in 2025) to fight biodiversity loss and reduce oil dependence (MEA, 2025a, 2025b). These joint frameworks signal how Global South countries are stitching together common approaches to sustainability outside the old West-dominated channels (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024; World Government Summit, 2025).

Institutional and Political Recommendations

For lasting impact, scholars and officials recommend several concrete steps (CFR, 2024; Darnal, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024):

Multilateral Reform: Southern nations should coordinate on proposals for institutional change. This includes a push for Security Council expansion, or at least new veto‑restrictions, and quota shifts in the IMF/World Bank (CFR, 2024; Diplomacy.edu, 2023). The Council on Foreign Relations notes that the next UN Secretary‑General must be responsive to the South’s demand for equity (CFR, 2024). Similarly, the G‑77 has stressed that a strong voice in the G20 and a possible creation of a permanent Global South caucus at the UN could amplify their agenda (Group of 77 and China, 2023; UNOSSC, 2024).

Resilient Supply Chains: Governments can form a Global South Supply Chain Forum to share best practices and negotiate common rules (e.g., against export bans) (UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). As Jaishankar suggested, shortening supply chains and diversifying sources can avoid over-reliance on a single region (Business Standard, 2025a; The Dialectics, 2025). For example, the African Union and ASEAN might coordinate on critical minerals, while Latin American countries could jointly invest in regional semiconductor fabrication, as envisioned by India’s National Critical Minerals Mission outreach (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024).

Technology Sharing and Open Innovation: Establish open platforms for AI and biotech research that do not require patent-protected technology transfer (UNIDO, 2025; UNOSSC, 2024). This could take the form of a South-South Open Science Council, where researchers share data on climate adaptation, public health and agriculture (UNIDO, 2025). The UN’s creation of an International Day of Science and Technology for the South in 2024 highlights this vision (UNOSSC, 2024). Countries should also scale up digital public goods: India’s offer to share its digital ID and payment systems with African and Caribbean partners is one model (MEA, 2025b; UNOSSC, 2024).

Economic Partnerships: Southern countries might expand their own development finance institutions (CFR, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024). India’s EXIM Bank and China’s Silk Road Fund provide lines of credit tailored to Southern peers (MEA, 2025a; UNCTAD, 2024). For example, India extended a 200 million USD defence line of credit for Angola (MEA, 2025a). Similar funds could prioritise projects like rural electrification or agro‑industry rather than extractive megaprojects (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024). Cooperation on currency swaps or a BRICS/AIIB-style bank could reduce dependency on the US dollar and stabilise investment flows (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; Dejusticia, 2025).

Unified Political Forums: Convene regular Global South summits (beyond G‑77 meetings), or formalise “like-minded” groups that align on UN votes (CFR, 2024; FOGGS & HumanizaCom, 2023; World Government Summit, 2025). Jaishankar recommended using existing forums for “enhanced solidarity and collaboration” (Business Standard, 2025b; The Dialectics, 2025). For instance, an annual Global South Heads of State Summit could align positions on sanctions, trade deals and peace initiatives (CFR, 2024; Dejusticia, 2025). Electoral blocs in the UN (like the African Group or Caribbean Community) should also coordinate trade and climate proposals to amplify their leverage (Darnal, 2024; FOGGS & HumanizaCom, 2023).

Climate Justice Initiatives: Push for binding commitments on loss and damage funding and ensure Northern emissions targets translate to Southern development aid (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; UNCTAD, 2024). Scholars advise establishing a Global South Climate Observatory to monitor the implementation of climate finance commitments (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025). Developing nations can insist that any new trade pact include climate equity clauses, echoing Rio’s CBDR principle (Group of 77 and China, 2023; UNCTAD, 2024).

Each of these recommendations draws on recent data and proposals. For example, UNCTAD’s 2024 Forum urged leaders to build “sustainable, inclusive and resilient supply chains… ensuring fair participation in global trade” (UNCTAD, 2024; Young, 2024). India’s own diplomats, from Jaishankar to MEA spokespeople, have advocated for exactly these measures -from diversified chains to knowledge sharing -as ways to “democratize production” and secure the Global South’s developmental priorities (Business Standard, 2025a, 2025b; MEA, 2025a, 2025b; UNCTAD, 2024). As global instability continues, only an empowered and cooperative Global South can reshape international governance to be more just and effective (Benkenstein & Joseph, 2025; CFR, 2024; Dejusticia, 2025).

References

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author (s). They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Jindal Centre for the Global South or its members.

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