China’s Digital Strategy: Technology and Influence in the Global South

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Riddhi Khajanchi
Research Intern, Jindal Centre for the Global South,
O.P. Jindal Global University, India

With the advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI), China has been exporting a range of AI technologies with the aim of promoting its governance model and extending its influence across numerous countries in the Global South. Rather than merely selling products, China is exporting AI-powered systems such as “Smart City” and “Safe City” projects, which employ cameras, sensors, and data to manage urban environments. This strategy, which is a component of China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR), an initiative under the larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aims to provide a competitive alternative to Western models of digital governance while also influencing global norms for technology standards.  Furthermore, through its 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan, China aims to become the world leader in AI by 2030. This article examines how these technologies influence digital governance, public safety, and, crucially, citizen trust, while simultaneously expanding China’s geopolitical reach in many developing nations of the Global South.

Drivers of Technology Adoption in the Global South

The adoption of Chinese surveillance tools in developing countries is driven by both pragmatic considerations and strategic governance objectives. Countries in the Global South present China with significant business opportunities and economic benefits, as they are generally more receptive to Chinese engagement than to the United States or Europe (Tao, 2025). At the same time, many BRI-linked Global South countries face a digital gap compared with economically advanced nations in the emerging global digital economy (BAARK, 2024). Given the development challenges and constrained budgets in many of these countries, China is exporting digital technologies that provide a cheaper and more accessible way to enhance infrastructure. But this also makes these nations more reliant on Chinese businesses.  Beijing’s model of internet governance, which emphasizes state control, censorship, surveillance, and limitations on online freedoms, is frequently followed by these digital giants. As a result, many nations may adopt or be influenced by this “authoritarian internet model” (Willemyns, 2024).  As use increases, nations in the Global South might eventually find it more difficult to diversify their digital infrastructure or conform to Western norms.  E.g., ZTE and Huawei have executed more than 350 smart city initiatives globally.

These initiatives have been implemented in more than 60 countries, including the Philippines, Pakistan, and Malaysia. They are integrated into government functions such as traffic management and public service delivery, and are primarily promoted as “safe cities,” albeit with a strong emphasis on surveillance (Heeks et al., 2024). China is not merely addressing the digital divide; it is quietly shaping the rules and norms of the future internet. By embedding its technologies deeply within the governance systems of developing nations, China strategically secures long-term influence, turning the digital sphere into a new arena of global power competition. 

Moreover, in many African countries, China leverages aid and loans and this is framed under its South-South Cooperation Policy, as financial incentives to encourage governments to purchase and expand the use of its surveillance technologies (Messieh, 2025). This demonstrates that these surveillance exports are not merely commercial transactions, but a strategic effort to extend Chinese influence over African governance and security systems. As a result, African states become increasingly reliant on Beijing, particularly as Chinese aid is typically provided without political conditions.

Citizen Trust and Privacy Concerns

Public sentiment towards China’s AI exports is often negative. Concerns arise because government procurement processes are frequently opaque, many governments lack the technical capacity to deploy AI effectively, and risks surrounding data privacy and security persist (Bouey et al., 2023). Consequently, public trust and AI literacy have become increasingly vital in determining the legitimacy, acceptance, and effectiveness of AI technologies.

In Uganda, Huawei’s facial recognition systems have been deeply integrated into government policies, raising serious concerns regarding surveillance and citizen outreach (Amin, 2024). Rather than being used solely to enhance services, AI technology can function as a tool of power, employed for monitoring and control. These risks are evident not only in authoritarian states but also in democracies. For instance, worries about governmental access to personal data and monitoring have been raised by a Chinese-style national data center in Senegal, a nation that is typically seen as a stable democracy.  Even while liberties are still in place, there may be a shift toward authoritarianism due to rising views of corruption and discontent with democratic governance (Amin, 2024).

These examples from Uganda and Senegal illustrate that China’s AI technology does not operate uniformly across contexts. In authoritarian states, it reinforces state control, whereas in democratic settings, it can gradually shift politics towards greater surveillance and reduced accountability. In effect, technology often aligns with and strengthens existing power structures. If citizens perceive AI technologies primarily as instruments of control, public trust in institutions may decline. This can lead to resistance, protests, or a loss of confidence in democracy itself, ultimately undermining the very systems governments aim to strengthen through AI.

Conclusion

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a major driver of global power, shaping how nations compete in economics, defense, and technology. It is now a strategic asset, influencing national security, global trade, and diplomatic relations. China’s export of AI technologies powers its digital rise but they support surveillance and censorship, spreading limits on individual freedom. Furthermore, China sets technical rules, and this creates dependence, shapes digital habits, and ultimately gives itself more leverage in future political dealings. Many Global South countries rely on Chinese AI because it is affordable, faster to deploy, and comes with full technical support, but this convenience can create deep dependence on China’s systems and standards. To protect themselves, Global South states need strong rules for data, more transparency, and a mix of technology partners so no single country holds too much power over their digital future.

References

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author (s). They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Jindal Centre for the Global South or its members.

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